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I propose a model in which firms can convey their quality by listing on a stock exchange. 
To list, firms must comply with costly listing requirements allowing investors to recognize 
imperfectly their quality. A profit maximizing exchange may set listing requirements leading 
to  high  information  efficiency  in  equilibrium. However,  this  is  strongly  linked  to  market 
conditions and firm characteristics. The information content of a listing depends not only on 
the level of listing requirements, but also on the characteristics of firms incited to list. High 
listing  requirements  are  not  a  guarantee  for  the  highest  efficiency  and  the  latter  may  be 
achieved with low requirements. Whether information efficiency is socially desirable depends 
on compliance costs and forgone growth opportunities which reduce welfare. The analysis 
yields implications for the choice of the listing locations by firms, as well as the organization 
of stock markets. 
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The Certification Role of Listings 
 
1.  Introduction 
This paper studies to what extent listing on a stock market can reduce information 
asymmetries between firms and investors. One important traditional function of exchanges 
has been to certify the quality of listed firms. Many stock markets list firms on the basis of 
some  requirements  going  from  a  minimum  market  capitalization  to  specific  corporate 
governance standards. However, the stock market industry has been deeply changing in the 
last decades since competition among exchanges for volume and listings has sharpened and 
exchanges are increasingly demutualized and listed companies.  There is now a debate on 
whether profit maximizing and competing exchanges will or even should continue to regulate 
listings. Also, while regulators tend to tighten listing requirements, exchanges increasingly 
create  lightly  regulated  listing  venues.  Although  some  argue  that  certification  is  not 
compatible with profit maximization (Macey and O’Hara (2005)), others show that exchanges 
may  set  high  listing  requirements  in  equilibrium  because  this  enhances  their  reputation 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006), or increases liquidity (Huddart et al. (1999)). In these 
papers,  firms  only  differ  in  quality.  The  present  paper  complements  this  literature  by 
analyzing how difference in listing incentives among firms of the same quality affect the 
listing decision of firms, and thereby the decision upon listing requirements by an exchange as 
well as the reaction of an exchange to imposed listing requirements through the creation of 
additional segments. 
  The  present  analysis  shows  that  optimal  listing  requirements  set  by  a  profit 
maximizing exchange depend on the efficiency of these requirements which in turn depends 
strongly on the structure of the incentives of firms to list. If incentives differ among firms of 
the same quality, their need for regulation is different and they may sort between differently 
regulated  exchanges  according  to  factors  that  are  not  correlated  with  their  quality.  Thus, 
listing requirements have an indirect effect on the informativeness of a listing by influencing 
the number and types of listed firms. The sorting of firms may either enforce or counter the 
intended effect of listing requirements. If the former is the case, a profit maximizing exchange 
is incited to set a high level of listing requirements and this also leads to high information 
efficiency in the economy. However, for the highest levels of possible listing requirements, 
the sorting of firms is always detrimental to efficiency because firms of a high quality stop 
listing. An exchange may offer efficient certification services in equilibrium. However, this is   3 
tightly  linked  to  market  conditions  and  may  occur  at  a  relatively  low  level  of  listing 
requirements. 
The model’s  main ingredients  are the following. There is  an exchange  which sets 
listing requirements that firms must satisfy if they list. The quality of firms is unknown to 
investors. Listing requirements allow investors to observe a noisy signal about the firms’ 
quality. Investors update their belief about the firms’ value according to their information. 
Complying with listing requirements is costly for firms and these costs differ across firms. 
When firms apply for a listing they trade off the expected increase in their market value 
against compliance costs. The exchange charges a listing fee which is proportional to the 
firms’ market value. It trades off a high number of firms against highly valued firms when 
setting the level of listing requirements. 
Costs related to listing requirements can be correlated with the quality of firms: high 
quality firms might bear fewer costs to comply with a given level of requirements than low 
quality firms. But listing costs might also vary with firm characteristics unrelated to the firms’ 
quality. Depending on the institutional environment of firms, or on their internal organization 
and corporate habits, complying with a given level of requirements can represent a more or 
less important financial effort. It is the component of costs which is not correlated to the 
quality of firms that is analyzed here. This cost component creates different incentives to list 
for firms of the same quality.  
Results are the following. If the difference in compliance costs for firms of the same 
quality is small, the impact of changing compliance costs in the firms’ incentives to list is 
similar for all firms. The main determinant of the firms’ listing decision is the revaluation 
which is diverging between good and bad firms: a higher level of listing requirements always 
increases  the  valuation  gain  good  firms  can  obtain  from  listing,  whereas  it  lowers  the 
valuation gain of bad firms. This may incite a profit maximizing exchange to set a high level 
of listing requirements at which good firms separate from bad firms by listing, in equilibrium. 
In  this  case  it  is  not  worthwhile  for  bad  firms  to  mimic  good  ones  by  listing,  because 
compliance  costs  exceed  the  expected  valuation  gain.  Information  about  firm  values  is 
perfectly revealed through this sorting effect. 
If the difference in  compliance costs is  high,  the incentives  of firms  are not  only 
determined by valuation gains that diverge depending on the firms’ type, but also to a larger 
extent by compliance costs which influence incentives in the same way regardless of the 
quality of firms. In this case, the effect of listing requirements is always weakened because 
while good firms with high costs are deterred from listing, bad firms with low costs still list.   4 
Thus the sorting occurs not only according to quality but also according to compliance costs. 
In this case, separation is impossible. The exchange never sets a high listing requirement since 
the valuation gains of listing firms are smaller. Valuations are inefficient on the exchange 
because  firms  of  different  qualities  pool  (except  for  a  high  enough  level  of  listing 
requirements at which only good firms with low costs list). However, the sorting due to listing 
requirements also affects the efficiency of values outside the exchange since non listed firms 
of different qualities also pool. Information efficiency in the economy is always worse when 
incentives to list differ strongly among firms of the same quality. 
While increasing listing requirements may improve efficiency in the economy in the 
case compliance costs are not too different, this raises welfare issues. Non listed firms do not 
bear  compliance  costs  but  forgo  a  growth  opportunity.  If  growth  opportunities  are  large, 
efficiency occurs at a welfare loss. However, this also represents an opportunity cost for the 
exchange. Thus, if firms have large growth opportunities, the exchange is less likely to set a 
high level of listing requirements in equilibrium.  
If a regulator imposes a level of listing requirements, an exchange always creates a 
more regulated segment if the mandatory standards are small and the valuation gain of firms 
listing on the more regulated segment is high. Although information efficiency is improved 
for firms with low costs, it renders the less regulated segment less attractive and reduces 
therefore the total number of listed firms deteriorating thereby not only efficiency for firms 
with high costs, but also welfare. If the imposed level of listing requirements is high, the 
exchange optimally creates a less regulated segment if it can attract many new listings. This is 
in particular the case, if firms diverge in compliance costs, and if their growth opportunities 
are large.  
The  contribution  of  this  paper  is  twofold.  First,  this  paper  complements  existing 
literature on the listing choices of firms by considering explicitly the impact of listing costs, 
and  in  particular  compliance  costs  of  firms.  Costs  related  to  the  compliance  with  listing 
requirements  seem  to  play  an important  role in  the listing decision of firms.
2 This paper 
demonstrates that these costs may have an important influence on the optimal decisions of 
exchanges and firms and, in particular, may impede a potential certification role of exchanges. 
Second,  this  paper  co mplements  literature  on  stock  market  organization  and  in 
particular literature on listing / disclosure requirements, since this literature mostly takes the 
                                                 
2 See Bancel and Mittoo 2001, Baba and Yamori 2001, Houston and Jones 2002 and Mittoo 1992 for enquiries 
of managers form Canadian, European and Japanese firms having listed their firms in the US. The World 
Federation of Exchanges underlined in its « Disclosure Survey » for 2003 the necessity for regulators to take into 
account the costs created by regulations concerning listings.   5 
characteristics of exchanges as given and focuses on the endogenous choices of firms and 
traders (exceptions are Chemmanur and Fulghieri 2006, Huddart et al. 1999 and Foucault and 
Parlour 2004).
3 Considering the listing conditions of an exchange as an endogenous outcome 
resulting from the optimization of its profit, allows determining what the opportunit ies of 
firms are regarding listing choices. In particular, if listing acts as an information revelation 
mechanism, all high quality firms should prefer the exchange with the highest requirement in 
the absence of some deterring costs to obtain the highest m arket value. If, however, a profit 
maximizing exchange optimally sets a low listing standard in the first place, firms cannot use 
the stock market to reveal information on their quality efficiently. 
The listing decisions of firms are often motivated by the possibility for firms to send a 
signal about their quality. Staughton et al. (2001) develop a model in which firms list on a 
stock market in order to signal the quality of their products. Consumers infer the product 
quality from the stock price
4. In the field of cross-listings, several enquiries of managers 
whose firms are listed in the US show that revealing information about the firm’s quality is 
one of the most important motivations for cross-listings (Bancel and Mittoo 2001, Baba and 
Yamori 2001, Houston and Jones 2002, Mittoo 1992). The idea of signaling in the context of 
cross-listings is related to the theories of legal bonding (Coffee, 2002) or reputational bonding 
(Siegel, 2005). Firms signal their quality by bonding themselves to tough listing requirements, 
strong  regulatory  bodies,  or  reputational  intermediaries.
5  Based on these theories, Fuerst 
(1998) develops a model in which firms issuing high profitability reports list on the strictest 
regulated  exchange  whereas  firms  issuing  low  profitability   reports  list  on  less  strict 
exchanges, provided that the difference in regulatory strictness between exchanges is high 
enough. Consistent with the signaling hypothesis, Doidge et al. (2004 and 2007) document an 
increase in the market value of firms cross -listed  in  the  US  (the  so  called  “cross-listing 
premium”), evidence also supported by Sarkissian and Schill (2007). 
However, some literature challenges the signaling hypothesis by showing that many 
other criteria than listing requirements determine the choice of listing places: the presence on 
the foreign product market (Biddle and Saudagaran 1995, Pagano et al. 2002), the size, sector 
                                                 
3 Papers on listing or trading choices include: Doidge et al. 2004, Easley and O’Hara 2007, , Foucault and Gehrig  
2007, Fuerst 1998, Barth et al. 1999. 
4 The certification mechanism stems from the willingness of the listed firms to subject themselves to the scrutiny 
of outside analysts and relies on the existence of a large body of investors that engage actively in the price 
discovery process. 
5 Siegel shows that in the case of Mexican firms cross-listed in the US, the market punished firms that were 
accused of large-scale asset taking in Mexico, but that were not prosecuted by the SEC. Business press and 
analysts tracking governance abuses strengthen this reputation mechanism.    6 
and strategy of firms (Pagano et al. 2002)
6, the origin as well as the economic, industrial, 
cultural  and  geographic  proximi ty
7  of  the  host  country  relative  to  the  home  country 
(Sarkissian and Schill 2004, Pagano et al. 2001, Bancel and Mittoo 2001). Tough disclosure 
requirements tend even to be considered as a disadvantage by firms as they seem to prefer to 
list on markets with less stringent disclosure requirements than those on their home market 
(Biddle and Saudagaran 1995, Pagano et al. 2001). 
  The way in which firms choose listing places affects competition among exchanges. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006), who analyze competition among exchanges on listing 
requirements, as well as Foucault and Parlour (2004), who analyze stock market competition 
without addressing listing requirements, advance the idea of exchanges differentiating in their 
organization in equilibrium. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) model how exchanges set 
optimal listing requirements in the presence of reputation considerations. Firms almost always 
prefer to list on the market with the most stringent listing requirements. With two competing 
exchanges, the high reputation exchange sets higher listing standards than the low reputation 
exchange if the investor base is similar on both  exchanges. Firms apply first on the high 
standard exchange. In case of a rejection, they apply on the low standard exchange. However, 
if investors on the high reputation exchange incur high information costs, whereas investors 
on the low standard exchange incur low information costs, the reputation of the high standard 
exchange must be overwhelmingly higher to offset its disadvantage in terms of investor base 
and attract all firms first. In Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s model, the type of the firm is private 
information  of the manager and listing requirements  contribute to  reveal  the true type of 
firms. The only listing cost incurred by firms is the fee which is a fraction of the firm’s equity 
value. Costs related to the compliance with listing requirements are ignored.   
My  model  is  related  to  this  literature  as  it  also  leads  to  the  conclusion  that 
differentiation might be an equilibrium outcome. However, this is not only obtained under 
competition, but also for a segmented monopolist exchange. This result fits to the observation 
that many exchanges in the world act locally as monopolies (most firms list on their home 
exchange), and have several segments. Competition between exchanges similar to the NYSE 
– Nasdaq case seems to be rather rare. In addition, in contrast to Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 
                                                 
6 Pagano et al. (2002) show that European firms that listed in the U.S. between 1986 and 1998 were different 
from those listed in Europe. U.S. listed firms pursued a strategy of rapid equity-funded expansion and belonged 
in the majority to high-tech sectors. On the contrary, in Europe listed firms were more mature and less growing, 
relied less on exports and didn’t come from high-tech sectors. 
7 Geographic proximity is the great circle distance between the capitals of countries, economic proximity is the 
percentage of country i’s exports to country j, industrial proximity is the correlation between industry rankings, 
and cultural proximity is a dummy variable equal to one if languages are the same, or if there was a colonial 
relationship between countries.   7 
listing costs are explicitly addressed. Firms do not have the same preferences concerning the 
exchange on which they list because they face different cost – benefit tradeoffs.  
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 describes 
the incentives of firms and the equilibrium choices of an exchange upon listing requirements. 
Section 4 discusses information efficiency and welfare, and shows how these are related to the 
incentives of firms and the exchange’s optimal decisions.  Section 5 presents the equilibrium 
outcome with a segmented monopolist by  describing how an exchange reacts to imposed 
listing  requirements  by  creating  differently  regulated  segments.  This  section  also  outlines 
competition. Section 6 discusses implications. Conclusions are stated in section 7. All proofs 
are given in the appendix. 
 
2.  Model 
Consider firms which are either good ( g x ),  or  bad  ( b x ),  with  x the firms’ value 
known only to the firm’s manager and  b g x x  . The proportion of good firms is   1 , 0    and 
is common knowledge. Firms can realize a growth opportunity, z, if they list on an exchange. 
Listing firms must pay a fee to the exchange. It is a fraction,  f , of the firms’ market 
value.
8 The exchange also sets listing requirements that all listed firms must satisfy. Listing 
requirements comprise reporting information about the firms’ prospects as well as meeting 
corporate governance rules. They allow investors to observe a signal, s, about the value of 
listed firms. The level of listing requirements is represented by the precision of the signal, 
 >0.5, which is common knowledge.
9 With probability    investors observe the true type of 
listed firms. They observe the wrong type otherwise.  




 c C  , with 
c  uniformly distributed over the interval  h l c c , . They represent direct costs as well as indirect 
costs. Direct costs are for instance the establishment of reports according to some standards, 
changes in the internal structure of firms to comply with the requirements. These costs may 
differ across firms due to different internal structure, corporate habits, or cultural contexts. 
Indirect  costs  may  represent  costs  firms  incur  due  to  more  transparency  and  enhanced 
                                                 
8 A similar definition of the listing fee is used in Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006). Many exchanges have listing 
fees which are staggered according to the size of the issuing firms or the number of issued shares. The case of a 
fixed listing fee is discussed at the end. 
9 In Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006), the exchange selects the firms for listing. They define listing requirements 
in a similar way: the latter determine the probability with which the exchange accepts a firm that is not qualified 
for listing.   8 
reputation. The latter may for instance intensify competition on the product market leading to 
“proprietary” costs.
10 The cost can also be interpreted as an opportunity cost: the time spent to 
comply with the requirements is not used to develop new projects. Since these costs are to a 
large extent unobservable, I assume that they are private knowledge of the firm. 
Firms are assumed to disclose nothing else than what is imposed by the exchange. 
This is a restrictive assumption since good firms always benefit from signaling voluntarily 
their type to investors to the extent that the gains from signaling are not offset by the costs. 
However, an equilibrium without exchange never unravels completely because bad firms are 
incited to mimic at least a sub set of good firms. Allowing firms to disclose voluntarily some 
information about their type is left for brief discussion at the end.  
Investors  observe  whether  a  firm  is  listed  and  the  signal  provided  by  listing 
requirements.  They  adjust  their  beliefs  about  the  quality  of  the  firm  according  to  their 
information. The updated probabilities that the firm is a good firm given a good respectively a 
bad  signal,  are
g x g g p x s x P   ) (   and 
b x b g p x s x P   ) ( .  If  a  firm  is  not  listed,  the 
probability that it is a good firm is  nl p . All non listed firms have the same value. 
The game is organized in three stages. In the first stage, the exchange determines its 
level of listing requirements to maximize its profit, . In stage 2, firms decide whether to list 
to  maximize  their  market  value  net   of  the  listing  fee  and  compliance  costs.  In  stage  3, 
investors update their beliefs.  
 
3.  Optimal listing requirements 
Firms’ incentives. Listing firms realize their growth opportunity and since there is a 
signal about their quality, their market values are closer to their true type than without the 
existence of an exchange. Firms list only if they expect their market value to increase enough 
to offset listing costs. The expected value net of costs if firms list is for good and bad firms 
respectively: 
 
  ) ( ) ( ( ) 1 ( ) (   C p p p x x z f MV E
b g b x x x b g              (1) 
  ) ( ) )( 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) (   C p p p x x z f MV E
b g b x x x b b              (2) 
b g x x x     
 
                                                 
10 See for instance Verrecchia 2001   9 
The expected market value of both types of firms increases with the size of the growth 
opportunity. The precision of information affects market values in opposite ways. While it 
allows good firms to be better recognized and increases their valuation, it renders hiding more 
difficult for bad firms of which the value decreases. Since firms differ in compliance costs, 
their incentives to list depend not only on their quality and the precision of information, but 
differ also depending on their cost level, c. The firm among good and bad firms respectively 
which is indifferent between listing and not listing is the marginal firm, 
*
i c with  b g i ,  . Only 
firms  with  cost  levels  below  those  of  the  marginal  firms,  list.  At  a  given  precision, , 
incentive constraints are the following for good and bad firms respectively.  
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   (ICb) 
 
  nl x x x g p p p p f I
b g b       ) ( ) 1 (   
  nl x x x b p p p p f I
b g b        ) )( 1 ( ) 1 (   
 
i I   , with  b g i ,  , represents the valuation gain of firms due to the signal they have 
provided to the market (further on the revaluation). It is the only difference in the gain from 
listing of good and bad firms, since all firms implement the same growth opportunity if they 
list. Good firms have a higher valuation gain than bad ones. Thus, the marginal good firm is 
always higher than the marginal bad one (
* *
b g c c  ). For any level of listing requirements, 
listed good firms are more numerous than listed bad firms. A higher precision increases the 
revaluation of good firms whereas it decreases the one of bad firms. If all good firms are the 
only one to list,  ) 1 ( f Ig     since information revelation is perfect.  
Both marginal firms increase the higher the net gain form listing is. This is the case, 
the lower the listing fee is, the higher the growth opportunity is and the higher the difference 
in  qualities, x  ,  is.  However,  changes  in  the  marginal  firms  affect  posterior  beliefs  of 
investors and thus the revaluations of firms, which in turn influence the equilibrium marginal 
firms. Changes in the firms’ values due to information are not only determined by the level of 
listing requirements but also by the number and type of listed firms. The latter determine also 
the value of non listed firms. The fewer bad firms and the more good firms list, the higher is 
the revaluation of all listed firms which incites more firms of both types to list. However, a   10 
higher number of bad listing firms reduces the revaluation of both types of firms, inciting 
fewer of them to list. Besides the precision of information, the ratio of the number of listing 
good firms to the number of listing bad firms,  l b l g c c c c  
* *  (further on the proportion of 
good firms) determines investors’ updated beliefs. If this ratio increases, the probabilities to 
observe  a  good  firm  on  the  exchange  (
b x p and
g x p )  become  higher.
11  This  probability 
diminishes outside the exchange ( nl p ). 
How the level of the listing requirements affects the number and type of listed firms 
depends on how changes in the marginal firms influence revaluations. A change in the listing 
requirements affects the number of listing firms directly through the change in costs and the 
precision,  and  indirectly  through  the  impact  of  changing  marginal  firms  on  the  expected 
valuation gains. This indirect effect finds its origin in the differing cost factors among firms of 
the same quality. If compliance costs were equal for all firms or inversely correlated to their 
quality  (bad  firms  incurring  higher  compliance  costs  than  good ones),  good  firms  would 
always list as long as bad firms list since their valuation gain is always higher.
12 
While the  direct effect  of an increase of the precision   is  always negative for the 
marginal bad firm (the revaluation decreases but the compliance cost increases ), it has an 
ambiguous effect on the marginal good firm since the listing cost as well as the revaluation 
increase.
13 However, if the marginal good firm increases with  , the valuation gain of bad 
firms increases, inducing more of them to list, which in turn reduces the valuation gains of 
both types of firms. On the other hand, the fewer bad firms list the higher is the valuation gain 
of both types of firms and more of them are incited to list. 
 
Incentives and listing requirements. Bad firms benefit always less from listing than 
good firms. Those firms among bad ones with the highest costs are deterred from listing at 
levels of listing requirements at which all good firms still list (precisions for which  h g c c 
* ). 
If the cost interval ( l h c c  ) is small, incentives are mainly driven by the revaluation. In this 














 with  b g i ,   
12 Selection occurs through the precision of the signal and not through the different costs borne by firms as in 
Spence (1973). 





































































































c    11 
case the difference in the marginal firms is high since their common factor, the compliance 
cost,  weights  little  compared  to  the  diverging  revaluations.  There  is  a  level  of  listing 
requirements,  sep  , at which all bad firms are deterred from listing while all good firms list. 
This precision is such that the constraint, ICb, is binding. For  sep   to be attractive for the good 
firms with the highest compliance costs, the cost interval,  l h c c  , must be small enough. A 
necessary condition for separation of firms is: 
 
  T sep l b h b
sep
c c c c I
x
c     





          (3) 
l h c c c     
 
A higher listing fee,  f , and a higher minimum cost level decrease the net gain bad 
firms can obtain from listing and therefore also the precision up from which bad firms do not 
list. The cost difference, up to which firms separate,  T c  , is higher. A higher difference in 
qualities,  x  , has an ambiguous effect on  T c  since it increases the valuation gain of both 
firm  types.  However,  if  the  cost  difference  is  large  relative  to  the  difference  in  qualities 
( x c    2 ), separation is never possible. 
If the cost interval is small enough to allow for separation of firms, the marginal bad 
firm  decreases  the  higher  the  precision  is  since  it  is  adversely  affected  through  a  higher 
compliance  cost  and  a  smaller  valuation  gain.  If  only  good  firms  list,  an  increase  in  the 
precision also reduces the number of listed firms since besides the higher compliance cost, 
their valuation gain decreases. Information revelation is perfect on the exchange but since 
some  good  firms  do  not  list,  the  value  of  non  listed  firms  increases  which  reduces  the 
attractiveness of a listing. 
If the difference in costs is high, good firms with high costs are deterred from listing 
while bad firms still list and there is no level of listing requirements separating both firm 
groups. In this case, there is a range of small listing requirements
14 at which only bad firms 
are deterred from listing when the precision increases inside this range, and their number 
decrease monotonically with the precision. There is also a range of high listing requirements
15 
                                                 
14   
h
h
b g b c
c c I x fx z f
2
) , , ( ) 1 ( 5 . 0
*           
15    1 ) , , ( ) 1 (
2 *          l g b b
l
c c I x fx z f
c
   12 
for which only good firms with low cost list. As the precision increases inside this range, the 
number of listing good firms decreases monotonically. Finally, there is a range of medium 
listing requirements between the two extreme intervals, at which good as well as bad firms 
with high costs are deterred from listing. In this case, the number of good and bad listing 
firms can either decrease or increase (provided that  h i c c 
*  with  b g i ,  ) with the level of 
listing requirements. An increasing precision deters bad and good firms with the highest costs 
from  listing.  This  has  two  opposite  effects  on  the  valuation  gain  of  listing  firms:  the 
revaluation decreases the fewer good firms list but increases the fewer bad firms list. While 
the smaller number of bad firms incites more of both firms to list, the smaller number of good 
firms deters even more bad firms from listing but this attracts more good firms. 
 
Lemma 1 
Given that  T c c    , the number of listing good firms increases the higher the level of listing 
requirements is, if the increase in their valuation gain due to more precise information is large. 
 
If the positive revaluation of good firms obtained through the direct effect of a higher 
listing requirements is large enough to offset the increasing compliance costs, the number of 
listed good firms increases with the level of listing requirements. However, an increasing 
number of good listing firms also attracts bad firms on the exchange. Thus, when the number 
of good listing firms increases much, which occurs when the increase in the valuation gain is 
large, more bad firms are attracted on the exchange despite the higher listing requirement. 
Ceteris paribus, the revaluation of bad firms becomes smaller the more precise information 
revelation is. However, investors’ beliefs about the value of listed firms for both types of 
firms increase the higher the number of good firms relative to bad firms is on the exchange. If 
a high precision increases the number of good listed firms to a large extent, the valuation loss 
of bad firms due to a higher precision is offset by the upward shift of beliefs. This may induce 
more bad firms to list. Thus, although the valuation of bad firms decreases with the precision, 
this decrease is offset by the better possibility to hide among good firms. Also, since fewer 
good  firms  remain  unlisted,  the  value  of  unlisted  firms  decreases  and  bad  firms  are  less 
incited to remain unlisted. 
The revaluation  of  good firms  due to  the direct  effect  of a higher level  of listing 
requirements (holding the number of listing firms constant) increases the higher the initial 
level of precision is and the smaller the listing fee is. The change in the revaluation increases 
also with the number of good firms as long as it is small. When there are many good firms in   13 
the economy, the precision of information becomes less important in the revaluation of good 
firms. 
 
Exchange’s decision. The exchange has only revenues from the listing fee which is 
proportional to the market value of listed firms. There is a tension between listing many firms 
(including bad firms), and excluding bad firms from listing to increase the market value of the 
other listed firms. The sorting effect related to a higher listing requirements may increase the 
proportion of good firms on the exchange, which makes all values higher and increases the 
exchange’s profit. 
If  the  cost  interval  is  small  enough,  the  exchange  can  implement  a  separating 
equilibrium for a high enough level of listing requirements. This is optimal only if the smaller 
number of listed firms (only good firms list) is compensated by the valuation gain of good 
firms. If the cost interval is high and separation impossible, good and bad firms always pool 
either on the exchange or outside the exchange.  
 
Proposition 1 
If separation is possible, the exchange sets a level of listing requirements deterring all bad 
firms from listing if and only if  ) ( ) (      sep for all  sep    . The optimal level of listing 
requirements is determined by the following equation: 
  ) , , ( ) 1 (
2
sep l h b b
l
sep c c I x fx z f
c
        .        (4) 
Otherwise, the optimal level is listing requirements is always smaller than  sep  . 
 
Following equation 1, firms can separate if the cost interval is small enough. In this 
case the exchange sets either a precision above  sep   and lists only good firms, or a smaller 
precision and lists also bad firms. In any case, the number of listing firms always decreases 
the higher the precision is. Thus, the exchange only sets a high level of listing requirements if 
the increase in the market value of firms compensates their smaller number. If the exchange 
implements an equilibrium in which only good firms list, firms are valued at their true type. In 
this case, the exchange never sets the precision above  sep   since this only lowers the number 
of  listing  firms  but  does  not  increase  their  value.    Therefore,  the  optimal  l evel  of  listing 
requirements never exceeds  sep  in the case firms can separate. 
  If firms cannot separate (if  c   is high), the exchange always sets a smaller level of 
listing requirements than sep   in equilibrium. Since up from a particular precision level, good   14 
firms stop listing while bad firms still list
16, a listing becomes less valuable for bad firms. 
They are recognized with a higher probability which lowers their expected valuation gain. 
Thus, since for high levels of listing requirements, only a fraction of good firms list, bad firms 
stop listing for a level of listing requirements smaller than  sep  .
17 Separation of firms is 
precluded for a high cost interval. Therefore good firms with high costs never list at a level of 
listing requirements at which bad firms with the smallest costs list, even though the number of 
listing good firms may increase for some levels of smaller listing requirements. 
  The highest level of listing requirements a profit maximizing exchange may set in 
equilibrium (which is the one separating  good and bad firms), increases the higher the gain 
from listing of bad firms is. This is the case the higher the growth opportunity is, the smaller 
the minimum quality is, the higher the difference in qualities is, and the smaller the listing fee 
is. However, the higher sep   is, the smaller is the valuation gain good firms obtain through 
separation,  which  reduces  the  additional  profit  of  separation  an d  renders  a  separating 
equilibrium less likely. Although a high proportion of good firms in the economy translates 
into a high number of listed firms in the case of separation, it also reduces the valuation gain 
good firms obtain from separation since  sep   increases. Thus, a high proportion of good firms 
in the economy may reduce the likelihood that the exchange implements the equilibrium with 
the highest level of listing requirements. 
 
4.  Efficiency and welfare 
Efficiency. The more information about the true values of firms is reflected in their 
market value, the more efficient are the latter. Efficiency may be considered solely for listed 
firms. However, since listing requirements not only make the values of listed firms more 
efficient, but contribute also to separate firms (the number of good listed firms is always 
higher than the number of bad listed firms), the existence of the exchange has also an impact 
on the efficiency of firm values outside the exchange. Therefore, the efficiency measure used 
here reflects the magnitude of the reduction of information asymmetry in the entire economy. 
The less information asymmetry remains after the listing, the more informative is the listing 
and the more efficient is the equilibrium. Initially the market values of firms are distorted as 
                                                 
16 See footnote 13 
17 From footnote 14,    ) , , ( ) 1 (
2 *  l g b b
l
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c
      is the precision level up from which no bad firm 
lists. Since  ) , , ( ) , , (
*   l h b l h g b c c I c c c I     , this precision level is smaller than  sep  .   15 
bad firms are over valued and good firms under valued. The listing is able to reduce this 
distortion by revealing information about the firms’ type. In the best case, firms are valued at 
their true type after listing took place. An efficiency measure, E, is computed by calculating 
the  distance  between  the  average  values  of  good  and  bad  firms  and  their  true  value.  If 
efficiency is perfect, this distance is zero. 
The precision of information affects efficiency in several ways. On the one hand, a 
higher precision affects directly the revaluation of listed firms by making them more efficient.  
On the other hand, a higher precision affects the number of listed firms. If only bad firms stop 
listing as the level of listing requirements increases, fewer bad firms are misevaluated and the 
value of good firms is closer to their true value, which increases efficiency. However, the 
value of listed bad firms may become less efficient if the effect of a higher precision is offset 
by an increase in their value due to a higher proportion of listed good firms on the exchange. 
Thus whether  efficiency increases  with  the level  of listing requirements depends  on how 
sensitive the revaluation of bad firms is to changes in the proportion of good relative to bad 
listed  firms.  If  this  sensitivity  is  small,  a  higher  information  precision  always  increases 
efficiency if separation is possible. 
If, however, the cost difference is high, and good firms with high costs stop listing at 
precisions at which bad firms with low costs still list, the effect of an increasing precision on 
efficiency becomes more ambiguous. The more good firms remain outside the exchange the 
less efficient are the values of non listed firms. However, as good firms stop listing, values of 
listed  firms  may  also  become  less  efficient  despite  the  higher  listing  requirement.  These 
efficiency  impediments  are  attenuated  if  the  marginal  good  firms  is  increasing  in  the 
precision. In this case, the values of non listed bad firms and listed good firms become closer 
to their true type.  
Thus, depending on differences in the firms’ incentives to list, and depending on how 
listing requirements affect the revaluation of firms, a higher level of listing requirements does 
not necessarily improve efficiency in the economy. The direct positive impact of the precision 
of information of efficiency is larger, the smaller the difference in incentives among firms of 
the same quality is, and the higher the revaluation of good firms is. 
The changing marginal firms do not only impede efficiency in the economy, but also 
efficiency on the exchange, since an increasing proportion of good firms may deteriorate 
efficiency of the values of bad listed firms, whereas  a high proportion of bad firms may 
deteriorate efficiency of the values of good listed firms. 
   16 
Lemma 2 
The separating equilibrium leads to the highest efficiency in the economy as well as on the 
exchange since all firms are valued at their true value (E=0). All other equilibria lead to a 
lower efficiency. 
 
In all equilibria, a listing conveys information to the market unless the exchange sets 
its  listing  requirement  level  at  0.5.  However,  inefficiency  arises  due  to  two  factors:  the 
imperfect precision of the signal conveyed by the listed firms and the listing behavior of 
firms.  If  all  good  firms  list,  non  listed  firms  are  only  bad  ones.  Information  outside  the 
exchange is perfectly revealed, whereas there is information asymmetry on the exchange. The 
precision of the signal is small but concerns many firms. In the case only good firms list, 
information is perfectly revealed on the exchange. However, information asymmetry is only 
completely removed if separation is possible. In this case, all firms are valued at their true 
value and  0  E . Otherwise, information asymmetry remains outside the exchange. 
  Proposition  1  shows  that  if  the  cost  interval  is  small  and  under  some  particular 
economic circumstances, the exchange sets a high enough level of listing requirements to 
achieve  separation  of  firms  in  equilibrium.  In  this  case,  a  listing  certifies  efficiently  the 
quality  of  firms.  Otherwise,  information  asymmetry  on  the  exchange  and/or  outside  the 
exchange always impedes efficiency, in which case the listing does not certify efficiently the 
quality  of  firms.  The  certification  role  of  listing  is  indeed  related  to  the  level  of  listing 
requirements. However, it is determined by the incentives of firms to list and in particular by 
the  possible  separation  of  firms  the  listing  requirements  induce.  In  this  sense,  listing 
requirements improving the precision of information on the exchange, have an impact on the 
efficiency of the values of firms outside the exchange by affecting the listing decisions of 
firms. The differences in firms’ incentives determine not only the optimal decision of the 
exchange, but also the feasibility of an efficient certification through listing. If firms differ 
strongly in listing incentives, a efficient certification effect through self selection of firms is 
not possible. 
  
Welfare.  Because  signaling  is  costly  and  because  these  costs  differ  across  firms, 
listing requirement raise a welfare issue. Listing firms realize their growth opportunity which 
increases  welfare,  but  at  the  expense  of  compliance  costs  which  reduces  welfare.  Since 
investors  are  inactive  in  this  model,  they  implicitly  keep  their  holdings  until  payoffs  are 
realized.  Costs  related  to  the  compliance  with  listing  requirements  as  well  as  forgone 
investment  opportunities  reduce  the  payoff  of  shareholders  and  therefore  their  welfare.   17 
Investors’ welfare is also affected by misevaluation of firms. However, with some additional 
assumptions, the welfare gains and losses related to information asymmetry offset. If a firm 
lists, the old shareholders sell the firm entirely to new shareholders. If the firm is a good one 
and there is information asymmetry, they sell the firm below its value and incur therefore a 
potential welfare loss. However, this welfare loss is also a welfare gain of investors who buy 
the firm cheaper than its final payoff. Thus gains and losses offset. If the old shareholders sell 
an overvalued bad firm, they have a welfare gain which corresponds to the welfare loss of 
new shareholders. If the firm does not list, old shareholders keep their shares until the payoff 
is  realized  and  are  therefore  not  affected  by  changes  in  the  value  of  their  shares  due  to 
information revelation. Thus, changes in the firms’ values do not affect social welfare. To 
asses the described welfare effects, a measure, W, is computed by adding compliance costs 
and realized growth opportunities by listed firms. The level of listing requirements impacts 
welfare directly by influencing the size of compliance costs and indirectly by determining the 
number of listing firms. A higher number of listed firms has an ambiguous effect on welfare 




(i)  If separation is possible, welfare increases in the level of listing requirements if the 
cost savings are large relative to forgone growth opportunities and the marginal 
bad firm changes sluggishly. 
(ii)  If separation is not possible, welfare increases in the level of listing requirements if 
marginal firms decrease sluggishly, or increase quickly. 
 
Whether welfare increases or decreases with the level of listing requirements depends 
on the listing behavior of firms. If separation of firms is possible and the exchange sets a level 
of  listing  requirements  which  is  smaller  than  sep  ,  increasing  the  precision  reduces  the 
number of listed bad firms and increases the compliance costs of listed firms. The smaller 
number  of  listed  bad  firms  reduces  welfare  because  those  that  stop  listing  forgo  their 
investment opportunity. However, since they also do not bear compliance costs and bad firms 
remaining listed have a small cost factor, a smaller number of listed bad firms has also a 
positive impact on welfare. On the other hand, compliance costs increase for all listed firms 
which reduces welfare. If the exchange sets  sep  in equilibrium, the negative welfare effects 
due to fewer realized growth opportunities and higher compliance costs increase. Thus, there 
is  a  tension  between  welfare  and  efficiency  since  the  most  efficient  equil ibrium  is  not   18 
necessarily the most welfare improving one. If the separation of firms is not possible, the 
effects of an increasing precision on the total compliance costs are ambiguous. However, the 
more slowly marginal firms decrease the smaller is the welfare loss due to forgone growth 
opportunities. If marginal firms increase, additional compliance costs may be offset by the 
implementation of additional growth opportunities. The speed of changing marginal firms 
affects  the  amount  of  forgone  or  additional  (if  0
*     g c )  growth  opportunities  and 
determines whether welfare increases with the level of listing requirements. 
Information efficiency may not be socially beneficial because it occurs at a cost which 
is not necessarily compensated by social gains. However, information efficiency can bring 
many advantages. If good firms are not confounded with bad ones, they may be able to raise 
capital at lower cost and thus realise more investment opportunities. Informative prices are 
also useful to structure the incentives of managers (Holmström and Tirole 1993), or of an 
insider  to  engage  in  value-increasing  activities  (Faure-Grimaud  and  Gromb  2004).  If 
managers are only imperfectly informed about the quality of their firm, an efficient stock 
price  may  help  them  to  take  better  investment  decisions  (Foucault  and  Gehrig  2008). 
Consumers may be able to infer the quality of firms’ products from the stock price (Staughton 
et al. 2001). 
 
5.  Segmentation and competition 
Segmentation.  It  is  now  commonly  observed  that  listing  requirements  are  often 
imposed by independent regulators. Exchanges with self-regulating competencies regarding 
listing requirements are rare. Macey and O’Hara (2005) indicate that listings and delisting are 
increasingly  regulated  by  independent  agencies  and  provide  a  table  showing  that  self-
regulating exchanges were the exception among large stock markets in 2005. However, one 
also observes that exchanges create lightly regulated segments which provide listing services 
but are not subject to the regulation prevailing on their main segments. This is for instance the 
case with the AIM since firms listing on the AIM have neither to comply with requirements 
imposed by the European Directives nor with  full FSA requirements. In the last  years, a 
growing  number  of  exchanges  have  set  up  lower  tier  segments  resembling  the  AIM  in 
London.
18 This is in particular the case in the US where a new listing venue has been created, 
OTCQX, on which firms can list without complying with S EC rules.
19 On the other hand, 
some exchanges have also created segments with stricter regulation than the one imposed by 
                                                 
18 see Mendoza (2008) for examples 
19 See : www.otcqx.com   19 
their national regulator. This was the case on the Brazilian stock market, which created tightly 
regulated  segments  which  contributed  to  increase  the  value  of  firms  and  their  liquidity 
(Chavez  and  Silva  (2006)).  Thus,  creating  differently  regulated  segments  seems  to  be  an 
answer of exchanges to either low or too tough regulation. 
An argument advanced against strong regulation is that firms differ in their need for 
regulation (Mendoza 2008). Lemmas 2 and 3 show that this exclusion may impede efficiency 
as well as welfare, and eventually weaken the beneficial effect of listing requirements. In this 
context,  creating  differently  regulated  segments  may  mitigate  negative  effects  due  to  self 
selection  of  firms.  This  section  analyses  the  incentives  of  an  exchange  to  create  a  more 
regulated segment (upper tier segment) or a less regulated segment (lower tier segment) if a 
level of listing requirements, reg  , is imposed exogenously by a regulator.  
If the exchange creates an upper or a lower tier segment (with  reg    ), the segment 
with the imposed precision,  reg  , is labeled the “main segment” further on. Compared to the 
situation in which only the main segment exists, the possibility to list on another differently 
regulated venue induces some firms that would have listed anyway, to list on the additional 
segment  instead  of  the  main  one,  and  may  also  induce  firms  that  would  not  have  listed 
otherwise,  to  list  on  one  of  both  segments.  Firms  which  would  have  listed  on  the  main 
segment without an additional listing venue, list on the additional segment if and only if the 
valuation gain they obtain is larger than the additional compliance costs in the case of an 
upper tier segment, or if the valuation loss is compensated by compliance cost savings in the 
case of a lower tier segment. The growth opportunity and the listing fees are assumed to be 
the same on both listing venues.  
If two segments exist, the proportion of good firms on the main segment is likely to 
change and thereby also the valuation gain firms obtain by listing on the main segment, even 
though the listing requirements remain the same. The informativeness of a listing on both 
listing venues depends  now on the marginal firms listing on the main segment, 
*
,m g c  and 
*
,m b c
20, and the marginal firms listing on the additional segment created by the exchange: 
*
,s g c  
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21. Since the creation of an additional segment changes the number of listing firms and 
their listing place, it changes also the value of unlisted firms. 
  Because  revaluations  depen d  on  the  proportions  of  good  firms   on  the  different 
segments, the potential valuation gains or losses due to a higher or lower precision on the 
segments may be amplified or offset by the listing decisions of firms. If the exchange creates 
an upper tier segment, the revaluation of firms listing on this segment increases if they are 
good firms and decreases if they are bad firms for equal  proportions of good firms on both 
segments. If however, the proportion of good firms is higher on the upper tier segment than 
on the main segment, the increase in the value of good firms is amplified since the posterior 
probabilities of investors, 
g x p   and 
b x p ,  increase.  However,  higher  updated  beliefs  also 
increase the expected value of bad firms and lower therefore the negative effect of a higher 
precision on the expected value of bad firms. Bad firms may even expect a valuation gain on 
the upper tier segment compared to the main segment despite more precise information. This 
is only the case if the proportion of good firms on the upper segment exceeds the proportion 
of good firms on the main segment and is large enough so that the posterior probabilities to be 
a good firm conditional on the signal on the upper tier segment are higher than on the main 
segment. 
If the exchange creates a lower tier segment, the revaluation of firms listing on the 
lower tier segment decreases if they are good firms and increases if they are bad firms at equal 
proportions of  good firms on both segments.  If however, the proportion of  good firms is 
higher on the lower tier segment than on the main one, the valuation of good firms on the 
additional segment is even smaller which amplifies the effect of a smaller precision. The 
valuation of bad firms becomes also smaller, which diminishes the effect of a lower precision 
on the valuation of bad firms. If, on the contrary, the proportion of good firms is higher on the 
lower tier segment than on the main segment, the negative effect of a low level of listing 
requirements  on  the  valuation  of  good  firms  is  offset  because  of  their  higher  proportion 
among listed firms, but the valuation of bad firms listed on the lower tier segment increases 
further since in addition to the low precision, they are recognised with a smaller probability. 
 
 
                                                 
21 Marginal firms listing on the additional segment are determined by the following equations 
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Proposition 2 
If a level of listing requirements,  reg  , is imposed by a regulator, an exchange may optimally 
create an additional less regulated (lower tier) segment on which firms with high costs list, or 
an additional more regulated (upper tier) segment on which firms with low costs list.  
(i)  If  reg   is high, the exchange implements a lower tier segment if the number of 
listing firms on this segment is high enough. 
(ii)  If  reg    is  small,  the  exchange  only  implements  an  upper  tier  segment  if  the 
valuation gain of good firms with low cost is high enough. 
(iii)  The  level  of  listing  requirements  on  the  upper  tier  segment  never  exceeds  the 
smallest precision at which no bad firm lists on that segment (
u
sep   ). 
 
Upper tier segment. If the exchange sets up an upper tier segment, some good firms 
with low costs list on this segment (instead of listing on the main segment) since they expect a 
revaluation  which  is  high  enough  not  to  be  offset  by  the  higher  compliance  costs.  This 
reduces the proportion of good firms on the main segment, and makes a listing on it less 
valuable to good as well as bad firms. The probability that bad firms are recognized becomes 
higher on the main segment compared to a situation without segmentation. This may induce 
some bad firms with high costs to leave the exchange completely. However, some bad firms 
with low costs may also be incited to list on the upper tier segment if they can obtain a 
valuation gain. Even if some low cost bad firms list on the upper tier segment, the marginal 
good firm (
*
,s g c ) is always higher than the marginal bad firm (
*
,s b c ) since good firms benefit 
from both, the higher precision and the higher proportion of good firms.  
 
Lemma 4 
If  the  exchange  creates  an  upper  tier  segment,  the  number  of  firms  listing  on  the  main 
segment decreases compared to the situation without segmentation: 
* *
, g m g c c   and 
* *
, b m b c c  .  
 
The self selection of firms leads to a smaller proportion of good firms on the main 
segment and thus to a smaller valuation gain from listing. The marginal firms listing on the 
main segment become smaller compared to a situation without segmentation, even though the 
level of listing requirements  remains the same. Thus, the creation of a listing venue with 
higher standards on which firms with low costs can better signal their type leads to exclude 
firms with high costs from the less regulated segment. Information efficiency is the best on 
the upper tier segment since the precision is high and the number of bad firms listing on this 
segment is small (efficiency is perfect if no bad firm lists).   22 
If  there  is  a  level  of  listing  requirements  at  which  firms  can  separate  and  if  the 
imposed level of listing requirements is below this threshold, creating an upper tier segment 
only deters bad firms from listing. This makes the value of bad firms more efficient since 
more of them are valued at their true type outside the exchange, and the value of those bad 
firms listed on the main segment is on average closer to their true value. The values of good 
firms become more efficient only for those which are listed on the upper tier segment. Good 
firms with high costs are penalized by a less efficient value. To the extent that the valuation 
loss of good firms with high costs is not too large, introducing an upper tier segment increases 
efficiency in the economy not only because of the higher precision and the selection effect on 
the upper tier segment, but also because the crowding out effect on the main segment further 
contributes to separate firms. These efficiency  gains  create social  costs since fewer firms 
implement their growth opportunity and some firms bear higher compliance costs. If the size 
of the growth opportunity is large enough to offset the compliance cost savings of excluded 
firms, an upper tier segment always deteriorates welfare. 
If compliance costs are different enough so that separation is not possible, the upper 
tier segment may also deter good firms with high costs from listing on the main segment. In 
this case, efficiency deteriorates not only on the main segment but also outside the exchange 
since some good firms with high costs pool with bad ones. The crowding out effect leads also 
to fewer realized growth opportunities. Thus, if incentives of firms of the same quality differ 
strongly (and if marginal firms are decreasing in the precision), creating an upper tier segment 
exacerbates the welfare loss and does not necessarily improve efficiency. Only the upper tier 
segment always benefits from a high efficiency. If the marginal good firm is increasing in the 
precision, the exchange lists more good firms on its upper tier segment. This increases the 
attractiveness of this segment and induces even more firms to list on the upper tier segment 
instead  of  the  main  segment.  In  this  case,  more  firms  benefit  from  a  better  efficiency. 
However, this also exacerbates the exclusion effect since expected revaluations on the main 
segment become smaller. 
 
Lower tier segment. If the exchange creates a lower tier segment, firms with high 
compliance costs list on the lower tier segment instead of the main segment. On the one hand, 
these firms may be firms that would have listed on the main segment without segmentation. 
Listing on the less regulated segment benefits more to bad firms which prefer always lower 
listing requirements. Thus, there are more bad firms than good firms listing on the lower tier 
segment instead of the main segment. On the other hand, the smaller compliance costs attract   23 
firms on the exchange which do not list at all on the main segment. Compared to a situation 
without segmentation, the existence of a lower tier segment increases the proportion of good 
firms on the main market. The high proportion of good firms makes the main segment with 
the higher listing requirements more attractive to good firms, increasing further the proportion 
of good firms on the main segment and the proportion of bad firms on the lower tier segment. 
However, the main segment loses listings.  
If the cost difference of firms is small enough to allow for separation of firms, new 
listing firms are only bad firms since all good firms list anyway. As before, firms separate not 
only according to their costs but also according to their quality. The main segment looses 
mainly listings from bad firms. Thus, the value of the remaining good firms becomes more 
efficient although the listing requirements remain the same. Good firms listing on the lower 
tier segment incur, as before, an efficiency loss. Efficiency also decreases for newly listing 
bad firms since they were valued at their true value outside the exchange, but are pooled with 
some good firms and are thus on average overvalued. Thus, the effects of the existence of a 
lower  tier  segment  on  information  efficiency  in  the  economy  are  mixed  compared  to  a 
situation without segmentation. Only the main segment benefits in terms of efficiency. More 
firms  realize their growth  opportunity which improves  welfare. However, more high  cost 
firms also pay compliance costs, which reduces welfare. If the listing requirements on the 
lower tier segment are small and the growth opportunity high enough, introducing a lower tier 
segment improves welfare.  
If firms cannot separate, a lower tier segment allows also some good firms to list and 
to realize their growth opportunity. Since these firms were pooled with bad firms outside the 
exchange and benefit from a signal on the exchange (even though it is not precise), their 
values become on average more efficient. This also increases efficiency outside the exchange. 
Thus, compared to a situation without the lower tier segment, introducing the latter if the 
incentives of firms are very diverging has better efficiency and welfare consequence than 
when these incentives are similar. 
 
Exchange’s decision. Regardless of whether an exchange creates an upper or lower 
tier  segment,  firms  listed  on  the  more  tightly  regulated  segment  benefit  from  a  higher 
valuation in the case of segmentation. However, the source of the valuation gain is different 
depending on which of both segments is implemented. In both cases, firms listed on the more 
regulated segment benefit from a separation effect since with segmentation, the proportion of 
good  firms  is  higher  on  the  more  regulated  segment.  However,  firms  on  the  upper  tier   24 
segment benefit in addition from the higher level of listing requirements. The expected market 
value of firms is more sensitive to changes in the proportion of good firms when the precision 
of information is small. Since the level of listing requirements is higher on the upper tier 
segment than on the main segment, the major source of valuation gain for firms listed on the 
upper segment is the higher precision. If the exchange implements a lower tier segment, firms 
listed on the main segment benefit exclusively form the separation of good and bad firms.  
If  the  imposed  level  of  listing  requirements  ( reg  )  is  high,  an  upper  tier  segment 
procures only a small benefit to good firms for two reasons: their value is already high on the 
main segment and it is also less sensitive to changes in the proportion of good firms. On the 
other hand, since many firms are excluded from listing without segmentation, a lower tier 
segment allows many firms to list. However, valuation gains are modest as well on the lower 
tier segment since the precision of information is small and the proportion of good firms is 
small, as on the main segment because the expected value of firms is not very sensitive to 
changes in the proportions of firms’ types. 
If the imposed level of listing requirements is small, creating an upper tier segment 
benefits low cost good firms because they have a large valuation increase. However, those 
firms remaining on the main segment are also more sensitive to changes in the proportion of 
firms’ types, which amplifies the crowding out effect of firms with high costs. Thus, although 
valuation gains are higher, the number of listed firms diminishes even more than with a high 
imposed listing requirement. In the case of a lower tier segment, the number of new listed 
firms is small. Since the difference in compliance costs is small, only few firms list on the 
lower tier segment instead of the main segment. Thus, although firms remaining on the main 
segment are sensitive to changes in the proportion of firms’ types, the latter changes only a 
little which reduces the valuation gain of firms listed on the main segment. 
The income of the exchange depends on the one hand on the number of listed firms 
but is also proportional to their market value. If the exchange sets up a lower tier segment, it 
benefits from the higher number of listed firms. The value of newly listed firms is small and 
the one of those firms remaining on the main segment is either not responsive to changes in 
the firms’ types proportion, or the change in this proportion is small. Thus, the exchange is 
more likely to set up a lower tier segment in equilibrium, if the imposed level of listing 
requirements is high and if the number of newly listed firms is high. The latter increases if the 
cost interval is large and separation not possible, since in this case bad as well as good firms 
with high costs are attracted into the market. If the cost difference is small, good firms always   25 
list  and  newly  listed  firms  are  only  bad  firms  with  high  costs.  Thus,  strongly  diverging 
incentives to list across firms increase the likelihood of a lower tier segment in equilibrium.  
The level of listing requirements set by the exchange on the lower tier segment is 
always  smaller  then  reg    per  definition,  but  is  not  necessarily  the  smallest  possible.  The 
precision has opposite effects on the profit of the exchange. On the one hand, a relatively high 
precision on the lower tier segment reduces the number of new listed firms and the number of 
firms listing on the lower tier instead of the main segment. The smaller number of newly 
listed  firms  reduces  the  exchange’s  profit  but  the  smaller  number  of  switchers  has  an 
ambiguous effect. On the one hand, this lowers the valuation gain of those firms remaining on 
the main segment. On the other hand, switching firms pay smaller fees (at least the good 
ones). The more sensitive the exchange’s profit is to changes in the number of listed firms, the 
smaller is the level of listing requirements. It may be completely uninformative in equilibrium 
( 5 . 0   ). This is in particular the case, when the growth opportunities of firms are high. But 
a low level of listing requirements is also more likely, the higher the imposed precision is. In 
this case, the value of firms on the main segment is less sensitive to changes in the proportion 
of the firms’ types which lowers the revenue of the exchange stemming from the revaluation 
gain on the main segment. This leads the exchange to attract even more high cost firms. 
If  the  exchange  sets  up  an  upper  tier  segment,  it  always  loses  listings.  This  loss 
increases  the  smaller  the  imposed  precision  is.  The  exchange  only  increases  its  revenue 
through the higher valuation of firms listed on the upper tier segment. However, this valuation 
gain is also higher the smaller the imposed precision is. Thus, the exchange only sets up an 
upper tier segment in equilibrium if the valuation gain of good firms with high costs is large 
enough to compensate the loss of listed firms on the main segment. If firms’ incentives are 
heterogeneous enough so that separation is not possible, and if the marginal good firm listing 
on the upper tier segment increases in the precision, the exchange benefits also from more 
listed firms if it sets up an upper tier segment since it captures the listing of those firms that 
would not have listed on the main segment. Thus, a strong heterogeneity in firms’ incentives 
to  list  increases  the  benefit  from  an  upper  tier  segment  and  makes  it  more  likely  in 
equilibrium. Since the exchange’s profit is negatively affected by the loss of listings, the 
exchange is less likely to set up an upper tier segment if the growth opportunity of firms is 
high. In this case, deterring firms from listing represents an important opportunity cost of the 
exchange.   26 
The precision set by the exchange on an upper tier segment never exceeds the level of 
listing requirements at which no bad firms lists on the upper tier segment, 
u
sep  . In this case, 
the revaluation of the good firms listed on the upper tier segment is the highest possible since 
they are valued at their true value. Increasing the precision further only reduces the number of 
good firms on the upper segment since compliance costs increase without valuation gains, and 
lowers the profit of the exchange. 
The previous analysis assumed implicitly that the impose level of listing requirements 
is  below  the  one  separating  completely  good  firms  from  bad  firms.  If  reg  was  higher, in 
which case only good firms list on the exchange, the exchange never sets up an upper tier 
segment. If the exchange creates a lower tier segment, the profit stemming from the main 
segment diminishes because efficiency is already perfect. The exchange only benefits from 
more listed firms. 
 
Competition.  Theoretical  literature  on  exchange  competition  predicts  that  similar 
segmentation  results  could  arise  from  competition.  In  the  present  setting  two  competing 
exchanges could exploit the different needs for regulation of firms in the same way as a 
monopolist exchange creating several segments, and specialise on firms with different costs 
by setting different levels of listing requirements. 
If one exchange has a listing requirement equal to  reg  , another exchange may enter 
and compete for listings with a different level of listing requirements. If the entrant sets a 
higher level of listing requirements, the incumbent exchange looses listings because  good 
firms  list  increasingly  on  the  entrant  exchange.  This  renders  a  listing  on  the  incumbent 
exchange less attractive (see lemma 4). Thus, the profit of the incumbent exchange diminishes 
since in addition of loosing listings, the value of listed firms decreases. If the incumbent can 
bypass  reg   by changing its status, it will reopen as a lightly regulated exchange to capture the 
listing of bad firms and good firms with high compliance costs. Competition from a more 
tightly regulated exchange incites the incumbent to lower its level of listing requirements 
because it looses its certification ability due to self selection of firms. 
If  an  entrant  exchange  sets  a  lower  listing  requirement  than reg  ,  the  incumbent 
exchange also looses listings but since the proportion of good firms becomes higher, market 
values increase. Thus, competition does not necessarily decrease the incumbent’s profit if it 
comes  from  a  lightly  regulated  exchange.  Since  the  incumbent  benefits  from  the  high   27 
valuations of listed firms it may increase its listing requirement above reg  . In this case, the 
incumbent  becomes  an  exchange  specialized  on  low  cost  and  good  firms  and  exerts  an 
efficient certification role. On the entrant exchange, on the contrary, the values of firms are 
not efficient, but many firms with high costs can implement their growth opportunity. 
 
Proposition 3 
(i)  If two exchanges with a single level of listing requirements on each compete for 
listings,  they  differentiate  in  listing  requirements.  One  exchange  sets  always  a 
precision lower than  reg  . The other exchange sets a high one. 
(ii)  Exchanges never set the highest possible level of listing requirements. 
 
Differentiation  of  exchanges  stems  from  the  different  incentive  of  firms  to  list. 
Exchanges can always capture either the listings of otherwise unlisted firms or elsewhere 
listed firms, and attract some firms with high costs on a less regulated segment or some firms 
with low costs on a tightly regulated segment. 
The competition result is close to Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006). However, it is 
achieved with a different mechanism. In their paper, an incumbent sets a high level of listing 
requirements to keep a good reputation. Since some firms are rejected by the incumbent, an 
entrant sets a lower level of listing requirements in equilibrium to list those firms rejected by 
the incumbent. However, this result relies on the hypotheses that the incumbent rejects firms 
and makes selection errors, and that firms systematically prefer the most regulated exchange. 
In  the  paper  here,  differentiation  is  obtained  because  firms  have  different  benefits  from 
regulation  and  self  select  therefore  on  differently  regulated  exchanges.  Even  without 
reputation concerns  (the exchange only sets the rules of the game, but does not select listed 
firms), there is no race to the bottom because some firms always benefit from a higher level of 
listing requirements and the exchange can increase its profit by excluding firms and ensuring 
high market  values to  listed firms.  There is  neither a race to  the top  because firms  bear 
compliance costs. 
 
6.  Discussion and Implications 
Listing  fees.  The  model  is  analyzed  under  the  assumptions  that  the  listing  fee  is 
proportional to the market value of firms and that it is the same on all segments (or exchanges 
in the case of competition). However, an exchange could set different fees (different fractions 
of the market value of listed firms) on different segments. In this case, the sensitivity of the 
value of firms to changes in the beliefs of investors increases the smaller the listing fee is.   28 
Thus, an exchange of which the profit is mainly determined by valuation changes of listed 
firms has an incentive to set a low fee, whereas an exchange benefiting mainly from a high 
number of listed firms has the incentive to sets a high fee. In the case of segmentation or 
competition, the more strictly regulated segment (or exchange) may set a smaller fee than the 
more lightly regulated segment (or exchange). 
The exchange could also set a fixed listing fee. In this case, the fee also contributes to 
exclude high cost firms from listing. If the exchange lists firms of both types, the fee is the 
one the marginal bad firm is willing to pay, since bad firms have the lower valuation gain. 
This may induce the exchange to set a small listing requirement since its revenue is higher the 
more firms list and the higher the market value of bad firms is. If only good firms list on the 
exchange, the listing requirement never exceeds the one separating good from bad firms, but 
the fee might be such that some good firms with high costs do not list (even if separation is 
possible). The exchange may increase its profit by excluding good firms with high costs from 
listing to set a higher listing fee. Thus, if the fee is fixed, the exchange is less likely to set a 
high level of listing requirements, which impedes its certification role. 
 
Competition for listings. There is a debate about whether the American exchanges 
have lost their competitiveness with respect to listings as a consequence of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. Opponents of this act argue that it imposes excessive costs on firms. However, 
Doidge at al. (2007) show that despite fewer listings, the NYSE still attracts foreign firms and 
these also experience a cross listing premium. The present analysis shows that even though a 
tough regulation always deters firms from listings, including good firms, it may also attract 
firms that have a high benefit related to more precise information and that do not incur high 
compliance costs. Thus, firms expected to list on a tightly regulated segment or exchange, are 
those which suffer from a high information asymmetry, but which can afford the high listing 
requirements. Thus whether an exchange looses market shares (with respect to listings) with 
higher listing requirements depends first on the characteristics of targeted firms: not only their 
quality, but also factors affecting on the one hand their compliance costs and on the other 
hand their gain from high listing requirements.
22 
There is also a debate on whether a profit maximizing exchange may systematically 
set a low level of listing requirements, in particular if it competes with other listing venues. A 
race to the bottom may not occur because an exchange may want to keep a good reputation 
                                                 
22 Macey and O’Hara (2002) also argue that stock exchanges should only keep tight listing requirements if firms 
need exchanges as a certification intermediary.    29 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006)), or because it has a higher liquidity with tough listing 
requirements (Huddart et al. (1999)). The present paper shows that even with competition, a 
profit maximizing exchange may not necessarily set a low level of listing requirements if the 
firms which should list on that exchange experience a high increase in their value due to the 
signal the listing and the compliance with listing requirements represents. Thus, if listing 
requirements lead to a sorting of firms enforcing the effect of listing requirements on their 
value, an exchange is likely to set a high level of listing requirements. If however, this sorting 
is counterproductive in that it offset the benefic effects of the requirements, firms listing on 
the  exchange  have  not  a  high  value  and  the  exchange  is  less  likely  to  set  a  high  listing 
standard.  
 
Valuation effects. Several studies have highlighted positive valuation effects related 
to  the  tightness  of  listing  requirements  when  firms  cross  list  (Doidge  et  al.  2004,  2007, 
Sarkissian and Schill 2007, Roosenboom and van Dijk 2007). The findings in the present 
paper complement these studies by proposing a theory for a finer analysis of these valuation 
effects.  Since the effect of a particular level of listing requirements depends not only on the 
precision  of  the  information  revealed  through  the  compliance,  but  also  on  the  type  and 
number of firms that comply, valuation effects after cross listings or changes of listing places 
should differ depending on three elements: the characteristics of the firm, the characteristics 
of  firms  in  the  same  sector  or  industry  or  coming  from  the  same  country,  and  the 
characteristics of firms listed on the considered exchange. The valuation effect should also 
depend on the structure of the exchange industry. Depending on whether there are several 
segments or competing exchanges with different regulations, the firms listing on the most 
regulated segment or exchange are not the same. In particular, firms’ values should increase 
more,  if  there  is  segmentation  or  competition  that  leads  to  different  levels  of  listing 
requirements since firms separate more according to their quality. 
 
Incentives. Since the effect of listing requirements depends on which firms list, bad 
firms are not necessarily better recognized as such the higher the level of listing requirements 
is. Thus, if a listing requirement attracts many good firms and few bad firms, the latter may be 
able to hide better than on a segment with a lower level of listing requirements because of the 
high proportion of good firms on the exchange. This has an impact on the effect of listing 
requirements on the incentives of managers. Doidge et al. (2004) ground their models on the 
idea  that  the  cost  of  diverting  cash-flows  increases  the  stricter  regulation  on  the  stock   30 
exchange  is.  Implicitly,  these  papers  make  the  assumption  that  hiding  value  destroying 
activity becomes harder for a manager the tighter regulation is which increases its costs. As a 
result, the fraction of diverted cash flows diminishes the higher regulation is. However, if a 
manager is extracting private benefits and conditions this activity upon the probability to be 
caught, he may be incited to divert more cash flows on a more tightly regulated exchange 
even though investors have more precise information about firms, since his probability to be 
recognized may be smaller. Thus, the sorting effect among listing firms induced by listing 
requirements, has also an effect on how listing requirements affect the incentives of managers. 
 
Listing place choices and firm characteristics. The results in this paper stem from 
the effects of listing choices of firms. How firms react to changes in regulations and how 
firms from different sectors, industries or geographical regions choose in general their listing 
places is observable. This information can be useful to assess on the one hand decisions of a 
profit maximizing exchange or the possible development of the industry, and on the other 
hand characteristics of firms. In particular, analyzing listing and delisting decisions in relation 
with  listing  and  disclosure  requirements  may  be  an  indication  about  the  existence  of 
proprietary costs of firms. 
  The results in this paper also raise a question about the causality link between the 
existence of growth opportunities and the listing decision. It is sometimes argued that firms 
with  high  growth  opportunities  list  on  tightly  regulated  exchanges  to  obtain  a  cheaper 
financing  for  the  implementation  of  their  projects  (for  instance  Doidge  et  al.  (2004)). 
However, under the assumption that firms bear different listing costs, firms with high listing 
costs may not  list  because the listing is  too  costly compared to  the  expected  gains  from 
information and from the realization of their growth opportunity.  Thus, ex post these firms do 
not implement growth opportunities and are not expected to do so since the financing is too 
expensive. However, these firms may possibly have realized their growth opportunity if the 
access to the stock market had been cheaper. Thus, excessive compliance costs may prevent 
the realization of investment projects of firms that may have highly profitable ones.  
  If  an  exchange  creates  another  segment,  some  firms  switch  because  of  their 
compliance costs and not because of their quality. Thus, if a segment (or another exchange) 
with a low regulation is created, firms changing their listing place from the highly regulated 
segment to the new segment are not necessarily bad firms since they may simply bear high 
compliance costs and a lower level of listing requirements may lead to a higher market value 
(net of listing costs) for these firms. The same is true for firms switching to a more tightly   31 
regulated segment since they may be bad firms with low costs. The idea that down or up-
switching is not necessarily a signal about the quality of switching firms, is consistent with 
the result of Ramadorai and Jenkinson (2007) who show that initial stock price reactions after 
firms switch from the main market to the AIM and vice versa are reversed after some months. 
   
Voluntary disclosure. The exchange exerts its certification role not only through the 
precision of information inherent to listing requirements, but also by inciting firms to separate 
according to their type. If firms could voluntarily disclose the amount of information that 
maximizes their market value net of compliance costs, at least a sub set of good firms is 
mimicked  by  bad  firms  because  of  the  different  compliance  costs  of  firms  without  the 
existence of an exchange. In this case, a listing may still be valuable to firms, because through 
the self selection good firms are less mimicked by bad ones and voluntary disclosure may 
become more efficient. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
I  propose  a  model  in  which  firms  can  convey  their  quality  by  listing  on  a  stock 
exchange. To list, firms must comply with costly listing requirements allowing investors to 
recognize imperfectly their quality. A profit maximizing exchange may set listing conditions 
leading to high information efficiency in equilibrium. However, this is strongly linked to 
market conditions and firm characteristics. The information content of a listing depends not 
only on the level of listing requirements, but also on the characteristics of firms incited to list. 
High listing requirements are not a guarantee for the highest efficiency and the latter may be 
achieved with low requirements. Whether information efficiency is socially desirable depends 
on compliance costs and forgone growth opportunities which reduce welfare. The analysis 
yields implications for the choice of the listing locations by firms, as well as the organization 
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Separation is possible if  T c c    . The exchange sets  sep   if and only if: 
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The  efficiency  measure  is  computed  by  adding  the  average  misevaluations  of  all  firms 
weighted by their number. It is positive by construction.  
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Rearranging terms yields: 
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In the case of the separating equilibrium,  1   g I ,  h g c c 
* ,  l b c c 
*  and  0  nl p . This gives 
0        x x E . The separating equilibrium yields the highest possible efficiency. 
In all other equilibria, at least one term of equation (A5) is strictly positive. Thus, efficiency is 




The welfare measure is computed by subtracting total compliance from the sum of realized 
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Developing and rearranging terms yields: 
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In the case of separation,  h g c c 
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If separation is not possible, welfare increases in the precision if and only if: 
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The exchange sets up an upper tier segment if and only if: 
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Assume that only good firms list on the upper tier segment. In this case, the LHS of equation 
A11 is increasing the smaller  reg   is, if the increase in the valuation gain of good firms is 
higher than the increase in compliance costs such that  
*
,s g c  also increases. If also bad firms 
list on the upper tier segment, their valuation gain decreases the smaller  reg   is. Thus, for the 
LHS to increase, the gain of good firms must be even higher. A smaller  reg  has ambiguous 
effects on the RHS of equation A11 since marginal firms listing on the main segment increase 
the smaller  reg   is, the values of good firms decrease and the values of bad firms increase. 
The higher  reg   is, the smaller is the LHS. For high levels of  reg  , A11 does not hold and the 
exchange does not set up an upper tier segment. If  reg   is small, A11 holds provided that the 
valuation gain of good firms is high enough. In this case, the exchange optimally implements 
an upper tier segment.   34 
By a similar argument than in proposition 1, the exchange never sets the precision higher than 
u
sep   on the upper tier segment, with 
u





The exchange sets up a lower tier segment if and only if : 
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The higher  reg  is, the smaller are the values on the upper tier segment and the smaller are the 
marginal firms listing on the main segment. Thus the RHS of equation A12 is decreasing in 
reg  . A change in  reg   has ambiguous effects on the LHS. If  reg   is high, A12 holds provided 
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among listed firms decreases on the main segment. It follows that  ) ( reg g I    and  ) ( reg b I    
decrease. Since the valuation gains decrease, the marginal firms also decrease and: 
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Proposition 3 
Assume  the  incumbent  exchange  sets  reg I    .  An  entrant  can  enter  and  set  a  higher 
precision,  reg E    .  To avoid  that  the  incumbent  over  cuts  the  entrant,  the  latter  sets  its 
precision  such  that  ) ( ) , (         E I E reg I with 0   .  The  incumbent  can  increase  its 
profit by setting a lower precision. This also incites the entrant to lower its precision up until 
) ( ) , (           E I E reg I I to avoid that the entrant over-cuts.  
An entrant can also set a lower precision,  reg E     . To avoid undercutting by the incumbent, 
E   is such that  ) ( ) , (         E I E reg I . 
Since firms bear compliance costs, listings become fewer the higher the precisions are. Thus, 
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